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Abstract
This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where
agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents be-
come rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second
chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second
chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of
upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with
prospects for upward mobility. Second, when the cost is high, there are multiple
equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility, inequality and redistribution.
Numerical examples show that the shift from a high-cost economy to a low-cost
economy may reduce social welfare.
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1 Introduction
Why do Western countries have different welfare programs, even though they share a
similar background? Who supports redistribution in these countries? How is income
inequality related to redistributive politics? Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler, Storeslet-
ten and Zilibotti (2007) developed a model that responds to these questions based on a
feedback mechanism between individual decisions and redistributive politics (Glomm and
Ravikumar, 1995; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1997; Benabou, 2000). In this, the feedback
mechanism creates the joint determination of inequality and redistribution and results
in multiple equilibria: a pro-welfare state and an anti-welfare state. In the pro-welfare
(anti-welfare) state, expectations of higher (lower) redistribution lead to lower (higher)
educational investment, and thus a majority of the poor (rich) support higher (lower)
redistribution. The state realized then depends on the expectations of agents.
The model in Hassler et al. (2003) and Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007)
presents cross-country differences in welfare programs among Western countries sharing
similar backgrounds. However, they abstract from intragenerational mobility in their
model and hence preclude the predictions of the POUM (prospect of upward mobility)
hypothesis supported by US data (Benabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005):
namely, the poor do not support higher redistribution because of a hope for upward
mobility in the future. In order to explain the differences in welfare programs among
Western countries, there is a need to develop a model that includes an equilibrium that
supports the POUM hypothesis as well as multiple equilibria with different patterns of
redistribution, mobility, and inequality.
Independently of the above-mentioned studies, Quadrini (1999) succeeded in providing
a model, including the POUM hypothesis, based on an endogenous growth model that
produces multiple equilibria. This model encompasses a growing equilibrium with high
mobility, high inequality and low redistribution (supporting the POUM hypothesis), and
a stagnant economy with low mobility, low inequality and high redistribution (supporting
the case of a pro-welfare state). A key to this result is the assumption that the growth rate
of the economy affects agents’ preferences over redistribution policies and thus changes
the ability of the agents to know their position in the future distribution of income.
The multiple equilibria in Quadrini (1999) predict a negative correlation between re-
distribution and inequality, and a positive correlation between mobility and inequality.
However, while the former is supported by empirical evidence (Kristov, Lindert and Mc-
Clelland, 1992; Rodriguez, 2004), the latter is not necessarily supported by observable
data. Figure 1 illustrates the scatter plot of upward mobility (OECD, 1996) and the Gini
index (Fo¨ster and Mira d’Ercole, 2005), which appears to show a positive correlation be-
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tween mobility and inequality among sample countries.1 For example, the United States
features high mobility and inequality and Finland features low mobility and inequality.
The difference between these could be explained by the multiple equilibria in Quadrini
(1999). However, other European countries display various patterns of upward mobility
and inequality. For example, for workers aged 35-49 years, inequality is greater in the
United States than in Denmark and Sweden, but the pattern of mobility is similar.2 We
cannot explain this property using the theory in Quadrini (1999).
[Figure 1 about here.]
Motivated by the above-mentioned discrepancy between theory and evidence, we de-
velop a model that includes the equilibrium supporting the POUM hypothesis as well as
multiple equilibria describing different patterns of mobility and inequality among Euro-
pean countries. For this purpose, the paper utilizes a politicoeconomic framework that
incorporates the endogenous determination of income distribution by individuals’ educa-
tional investment (Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2007) based on the concept of a
stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium.3 We extend their model by introducing a second
chance at success. Agents who live for two periods, youth and old age, can become rich
or poor by undertaking costly investment in their youth. Successful agents can retain
this status over their life cycle. Unsuccessful agents, however, have second chances and
thus can become rich in old age through reinvestment in education. Within this extended
framework, we explore: (i) the relation between upward mobility and inequality and (ii)
the welfare implications of upward mobility in society.
We obtain the following two results not shown by previous research. First, we consider
majority voting over redistribution policy and obtain the following result regarding the
equilibrium properties. When the costs of a second chance are low, there is a unique, poor-
majority equilibrium characterized by a low tax burden on the decisive voter and high
levels of upward mobility and inequality: this supports the POUM hypothesis. Although
the majority are poor, they support a low tax burden for redistribution because of the
hope for upward mobility in the future. In contrast, when the costs of a second chance are
high, there are multiple equilibria. The first is a poor-majority equilibrium featuring lower
1We include limited, old data here because the available data on upward mobility are restricted to the
eight countries provided by the OECD (1996) for the period 1986–1991.
2The observation for Denmark, Sweden, and the United States is supported by empirical work by
Aaberge et al. (2002), who showed that inequality is greater in the United States than in Scandinavian
countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), even though the pattern of earnings mobility is remarkably
similar.
3Examples of studies utilizing a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium include Krusell, Quadrini and
R´ıos-Rull (1997), Grossman and Helpman (1998), Azariadis and Galasso (2002), Hassler et al. (2003),
Forni (2005), Hassler et al. (2005), Song (2005), Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008), Hassler, Storesletten
and Zilibotti (2007), and Bassetto (2008).
3
levels of mobility and inequality; the second is a rich-majority equilibrium featuring higher
levels of mobility and inequality. In the rich-majority equilibrium, mobility depends on
the costs of a second chance, and the tax rate on the young is indeterminate in that it
depends on the expectations of agents. The multiplicity of equilibria and the differences in
the costs and expectations jointly provide an explanation for different patterns of mobility
and inequality in European countries.
Second, we show the welfare implications of policies enhancing upward mobility. Mo-
bility may be a good thing because higher upward mobility means that the current status
of the poor is less persistent. However, mobility may also be viewed as a bad thing because
higher mobility means larger income fluctuations and thus economic insecurity (Atkin-
son, Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1992). Our framework captures the former aspect by
modeling upward mobility and characterizing an equilibrium that supports the POUM
hypothesis, but abstracts from the latter aspect by assuming linear utility functions and
no downward mobility. Therefore, an intuitive prediction is that upward mobility is good
for the economy. However, our analysis shows that a low-cost economy characterized
by high upward mobility may be inferior to a high-cost economy featuring low upward
mobility, at least in terms of social welfare.
The key to the second result is the education disincentive effect. The lower cost of
a second chance implies a higher probability of being successful in old age. This gives
agents a disincentive to invest in education in their youth and results in a lower number of
successful young agents and thus a smaller tax base. To keep tax revenue from the young,
the decisive voter imposes a higher tax rate on successful young. The smaller number of
successful young agents combined with a higher tax rate on the young jointly reduces the
expected utility of the young and thus social welfare.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section
3 characterizes the political equilibrium based on the concept of a stationary Markov-
perfect equilibrium. Sections 4 and 5 undertake the numerical analysis. Section 4 analyzes
the correlation between inequality and upward mobility, while Section 5 investigates the
welfare implications of policies that reduce the costs of a second chance. Section 6 shows
how the analysis and the results are changed when alternative assumptions are employed.
Section 7 provides some concluding remarks. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The model is based on Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007). Time is discrete and
denoted by t = 1, 2, · · · . The economy consists of a continuum of agents living for two
periods, youth and old age. Each generation has a unit mass. Agents are identical at
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birth. Young agents can affect their prospects in life with educational investment. In
particular, they either become rich or poor, and by undertaking costly investment, can
increase the probability ey of becoming rich in youth. The cost of investment, which is
measured in terms of disutility, is given by (ey)2.
At the beginning of each period, there are two types of old agents: those who were
successful in their youth and those who were not. Successful agents can retain this status
throughout their lifetime; unsuccessful agents have a second chance at success. A pro-
portion e0 ∈ (0, 1) of those who were unsuccessful in youth become rich in old age by
undertaking costly investment e0. The cost of investment is given by ηo · (eo)2, ηo > 0.
The parameter ηo represents the cost of getting a second chance. A lower ηo leads to a
lower cost of reinvestment and thus a higher probability of being successful in old age.
Rich agents earn a high wage, normalized to unity, whereas poor agents earn a low wage,
normalized to zero. Figure 2 illustrates the timing of events and the distribution of the
rich and poor.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Following conventional terminology, we refer to the first period of life as youth and
the second period as old age. Educational investment in youth, ey, is interpreted as study
at tertiary education institutions such as universities and college; educational investment
in old age, e0, is interpreted as study at professional schools for career development or
efforts at skill accumulation in on-the-job training. An individual may start in a low-
paying job, but with continued opportunity for training, he/she will be able to advance
into a higher-paying position or move to a different, higher-paying job.
There is no storage technology in this economy. Each individual uses his/her endow-
ments within the period. The government provides lump-sum transfers, s, financed by
taxes levied on the rich. The tax rates are age dependent, τ o for the old and τ y for the
young. The tax rates are determined before the young agents decide on their investment.
Therefore, the expected utility functions of agents alive at time t are given as follows:
V ost = (1− τ ot ) + st, (1)
V out = e
o
t · (1− τ ot )− ηo · (eot )2 + st, (2)
V yt = e
y
t · (1− τ yt )− (eyt )2 + st
+ β
[
eyt · (1− τ ot+1) + (1− eyt )
{
eot+1 · (1− τ ot+1)− ηo · (eot+1)2
}
+ st+1
]
, (3)
where V ost , V
ou
t and V
y
t denote the utility of the old who were successful in youth, the
utility of the old who were unsuccessful in youth, and the utility of the young. The utility
levels of V out and V
y
t are computed prior to individual success or failure. The parameter
β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor.
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Given these preferences, an old agent who was unsuccessful in youth has a second
chance at success, and thus chooses eot to maximize V
ou
t ; and a young agent in period t
chooses eyt to maximize V
y
t by taking account of the optimal investment in his/her old
age. Therefore, optimal investments by the old and the young are given by, respectively:
eo∗(τ ot ) =
(1− τ ot )
2ηo
,
ey∗(τ yt , τ
o
t+1) =
1
2
·
[
(1− τ yt ) + β
{
(1− τ ot+1)−
1
4ηo
· (1− τ ot+1)2
}]
.
We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1: ηo > 1.
This assumption means that the cost of education in old age is higher than in youth:
this reflects the fact that it is harder for agents to get educated as they grow older. The
assumption is sufficient to ensure that eo∗(τ ot ) and e
y∗(τ yt , τ
o
t+1) are set within the range
(0, 1).4
Because young agents are ex ante identical, agents of the same cohort choose the same
investment, implying that the proportion of the old who were unsuccessful in youth is
given by:
ut+1 ≡ 1− ey∗(τ yt , τ ot+1) = 1−
1
2
·
[
(1− τ yt ) + β
{
(1− τ ot+1)−
1
4ηo
· (1− τ ot+1)2
}]
.
Thus, the proportion of the old who were unsuccessful in youth, ut+1, depends on the tax
levied on the successful young agents in period t, τ yt , and the tax levied on the successful
old agents in period t+ 1, τ ot+1.
The tax revenues from successful agents are transferred to every agent in a lump-sum
fashion. The government budget is balanced in each period so that it can be expressed
as:
2st = [(1− ut) + ut · eo∗(τ ot )] · τ ot + ey∗(τ yt , τ ot+1) · τ yt
= W (τ ot , ut) + Z(τ
y
t , τ
o
t+1),
whereW (τ ot , ut) ≡ [(1− ut) + ut · eo∗(τ ot )]·τ ot is the revenue financed by the rich old agents,
and Z(τ yt , τ
o
t+1) ≡ ey∗(τ yt , τ ot+1) · τ yt is the tax revenue financed by rich young agents.5
4Expanding the range of ηo from (1,∞) to (1/2,∞) does not qualitatively affect the result shown
below. However, we obtain a new result when ηo is set below 1/2: the decisive voter will always prefer no
taxation on the old: τot = 0. All of the old agents can become rich after all because e
o∗(0) = 1/2ηo ≥ 1
if ηo ≤ 1/2. Because this result is trivial, we limit the range of ηo to (1,∞).
5An alternative method of transfer is a targeted transfer to old or poor agents. In addition, we can
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3 Political Equilibrium
This section characterizes a political equilibrium where agents vote on taxation period
by period. Section 3.1 provides the definition of a political equilibrium based on the
concept of a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium with majority voting. Sections 3.2
and 3.3 provide the characterization of the political equilibrium classified according to
the pattern of taxation on the old and the distribution of income.
3.1 Definition of Political Equilibrium
Following Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007), we assume that agents vote on current
taxes at the beginning of each period but that only the old vote. At the time of voting,
young agents are identical, while old agents are heterogeneous; there are two types, those
who were successful in their youth and those who were unsuccessful. Therefore, our
assumption focuses on the conflict between the two types of old agents. For more discussion
about the role of this assumption, see Section IIB in Hassler et al. (2003) and Footnote
6 in Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007).
With the optimal investments eo∗(τ ot ) and e
y∗(τ yt , τ
o
t+1) and the government budget
constraint, the indirect utility of the old who were successful and unsuccessful in youth
are given by, respectively:
V ost = (1− τ ot ) +
1
2
· (W (τ ot , ut) + Z(τ yt , τ ot+1)) ,
V out =
(1− τ ot )2
4ηo
+
1
2
· (W (τ ot , ut) + Z(τ yt , τ ot+1)) ,
where the term in the first line, (1 − τ ot ), is the after-tax income of the old who were
successful in youth, the term in the second line, (1− τ ot )2/4ηo, is the expected net benefit
from the second challenge for the old who were unsuccessful in youth, and the term
(W + Z)/2 is the lump-sum transfer.
The current paper focuses on stationary Markov-perfect equilibria with majority vot-
ing. The proportion of the old who were unsuccessful in youth (ut) summarizes the state of
the economy; the identity of a decisive voter depends on this proportion. An office-seeking
politician elected by voters sets policies to maximize the utility of the larger group. Given
these features, we now provide the definition of the political equilibrium as follows.
Definition: A (stationary Markov-perfect) political equilibrium is defined as a triplet
consider alternative means of government spending such as the provision of public goods. However, we
abstract from these alternatives and adopt a lump-sum transfer to all agents in order to keep the analysis
as simple as possible and to focus our attention on the political determination of taxes affected by the
presence of a second chance.
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of functions {T o, T y, U}, where T o : [0, 1] → [0, 1] and T y are two public policy
rules, τ ot = T
o(ut) and τ
y
t = T
y, and U : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a private decision rule,
ut+1 = U(τ
y
t ), such that given u0, the following functional equations hold.
1. T o(ut) = argmaxτot ∈[0,1]W
dec(τ ot , ut) (dec = os, ou), where:
W dec(τ ot , ut) =
{
W os ≡ (1− τ ot ) + 12 ·W (τ ot , ut) if ut ≤ 1/2,
W ou ≡ (1−τot )2
4ηo
+ 1
2
·W (τ ot , ut) if ut > 1/2.
2. U(τ yt ) = 1− ey∗(τ yt , τ ot+1), with τ ot+1 = T o(U(τ yt )).
3. T y = argmaxτot ∈[0,1] Z(τ
y
t , τ
o
t+1) subject to τ
o
t+1 = T
o(U(τ yt )).
The first equilibrium condition requires the decisive voter to choose τ ot to maximize the
utility of the old who were successful (if ut < 1/2) or unsuccessful (if ut > 1/2) in youth. In
the case of an equal number of successful and unsuccessful agents (i.e., ut = 1/2), the old
who were successful in youth are assumed to be decisive. The second equilibrium condition
implies that all young individuals choose their investment optimally, given τ yt and τ
o
t+1,
under rational expectations about future taxes and distributions of types. The third
equilibrium condition requires the decisive old voter to choose τ yt to maximize revenue
from the young. Rational voters understand that their choice over current redistribution
affects future redistribution via the private decision rule and public policy.
3.2 The Determination of T o and U
We now solve the equilibrium conditions recursively. Condition 1 defines a one-to-one
mapping from the state variable to the equilibrium choice of taxation of the old: τ ot =
T o(ut). Suppose that the majority are the old who were successful in youth: ut ≤ 1/2.
The objective function of the majority is given by W os(τ ot , ut) = (1 − τ ot ) +W (τ ot , ut)/2
that is strictly decreasing in τ ot : ∂W
dec(τ ot , ut)/∂τ
o
t < 0.
6. This implies that the old who
were successful in youth pay more than they receive because the unsuccessful agents pay
no tax, but the revenue is distributed equally between the successful and unsuccessful
agents. Therefore, the old who were successful in youth prefer τ ot = 0.
Alternatively, suppose that the majority are the old who were unsuccessful in youth:
ut > 1/2. The objective function of the majority is given byW
ou(τ ot , ut) = (1−τ ot )2/4ηo+
W (τ ot , ut)/2 that is strictly convex in τ
o
t : ∂
2W dec(τ ot , ut)/∂τ
o2
t = (1 − ut)/2ηo > 0. This
6When ut ≤ 1/2, the differentiation of W dec with respect to τot is:
∂W dec/∂τot = (−1) · [1− {(1− ut) + ut(1− τot )/2ηo} /2]− utτot /4ηo,
where (1−ut)+ut(1− τot )/2ηo < 1 under Assumption 1. Therefore, we have ∂W dec/∂τot < 0 if ut ≤ 1/2.
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implies that T o(ut) = 0 if W
ou(0, ut) ≥ W ou(1, ut), i.e., if ut ≥ 1− 1/2ηo; and T o(ut) = 1
if W ou(0, ut) ≤ W ou(1, ut), i.e., if ut ≤ 1 − 1/2ηo. In order to understand the result, let
us focus on the condition that derives T o(ut) = 0. This condition means that the size of
the tax base (1− ut) is small and the cost of education aimed at a second chance (ηo) is
low. The unsuccessful agents expect a low return from taxation on the old and a high
probability of being taxed in old age. Therefore, they prefer τ ot = 0 if ut ≥ 1− 1/2ηo.
The mapping that satisfies equilibrium condition 1 is summarized as follows:
T o(ut) =
{
0 if ut ≤ 1/2 or 1− 1/2ηo ≤ ut ≤ 1,
1 if 1/2 < ut ≤ 1− 1/2ηo.
(4)
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 3 illustrates (4) that satisfies equilibrium condition 1. Suppose that the decisive
voter is an old agent who was successful in youth: ut ≤ 1/2. He/she sets τ ot = 0 because
his/her marginal cost of taxation is greater than his/her marginal benefit of taxation,
∂(W/2)/∂τ ot . Alternatively, suppose that the decisive voter is an old agent who was
unsuccessful in youth: ut > 1/2. He/she sets either τ
o
t = 0 or 1 depending on the
magnitude of the correlation between the marginal benefit of taxation, ∂(W/2)/∂τ ot , and
the marginal cost of taxation, (1 − τ ot )/2ηo. The marginal benefit is smaller than the
marginal cost for ut ∈ [1− 1/2ηo, 1]; and the marginal benefit is larger than the marginal
cost for ut ∈ (1/2, 1− 1/2ηo].7
Next, we rewrite equilibrium condition 2 by substituting in the optimal investment
ey∗(τ yt , τ
o
t+1). This yields the following functional equation:
U(τ yt ) = 1−
1
2
·
[
(1− τ yt ) + β ·
{
(1− T o(U(τ yt )))−
1
4ηo
· (1− T o(U(τ yt )))2
}]
, (5)
where T o(·) ∈ {0, 1} is given by (4). Because T o(·) ∈ {0, 1}, any solution of (5) must be
a combination of the two linear functions: U(τ yt ) = 1 − (1− τ yt + β · (1− 1/4ηo)) /2 and
U(τ yt ) = 1− (1− τ yt )/2.
We derive the solution to the functional equation (5) by assuming rational expecta-
7Our model approximates Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) by assuming the prohibitively
high cost of education, ηo → ∞. Under this approximation, the critical level of ut illustrated in Figure
3, 1 − 1/2ηo, approaches one; the unsuccessful agents no longer prefer τot = 0 if ηo → ∞. Therefore,
Hassler, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2007) abstracted from the case where unsuccessful agents prefer no
taxation on the old. In contrast, we produce this case by introducing a second chance into their model.
It is shown below that the case supports the POUM hypothesis proposed by Benabou and Ok (2001).
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tions:
U(τ yt ) =
1− 1
2
·
(
(1− τ yt ) + β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
))
if τ yt ∈
[
0, β
(
1− 1
4ηo
)]
, or
τ yt ∈
[
max
{
β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
)
+
(
1− 1
ηo
)
, 1
}
, 1
]
,
1− 1
2
· (1− τ yt ) if τ yt ∈
[
0, 1− 1
ηo
]
.
Interpretation of the solution is as follows. Suppose that young agents in period
t expect τ ot+1 = 0. Under this expectation, young agents choose their investment as
ey∗(τ yt , 0) = (1− τ yt + β · (1− 1/4ηo)) /2. By (4), this expectation is rational if 1 −
ey∗(τ yt , 0) ≤ 1/2 or 1 − 1/2ηo ≤ 1 − ey∗(τ yt , 0) ≤ 1, that is, if τ yt ≤ β · (1 − 1/4ηo) or
β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηo) ≤ τ yt . Suppose, instead, that young agents in period t expect
τt+1 = 1. Under this expectation, young agents choose their investment as e
y∗(τ yt , 1) =
(1− τ yt )/2. By (4), their expectation is rational if 1/2 < 1− ey∗(τ yt , 1) ≤ 1− 1/2ηo, that
is, if τ yt ≤ 1− 1/ηo.
The solution depends on the expectations of agents. Figure 4 illustrates four possible
cases of U that satisfy the second equilibrium condition. These cases are classified ac-
cording to the magnitude of the correlation between β · (1 − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηo) and 1,
and between β · (1− 1/4ηo) and (1− 1/ηo).
[Figure 4 about here.]
As depicted in Figure 4, there are multiple, self-fulfilling expectations of U for a
certain set of τ yt . Which U arises in equilibrium depends on the expectations of agents.
To illustrate U in equilibrium, we introduce the critical rate of τ yt : θ ≤ min{1− 1/η0, β ·
(1− 1/4ηo)}. The rate θ, which depends on the expectations of agents, is the highest tax
rate that yields a majority of the old who were successful in youth for the range of τ yt that
yields multiple expectations. For τ yt > θ, the majority is the old who were unsuccessful
in youth. However, for τ yt ∈ (0, θ), the majority are either successful or unsuccessful
depending on agents’ expectations. The function is thus reduced as follows:
U(τ yt ) =
{
1− 1
2
·
(
(1− τ yt ) + β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
))
, 1− 1
2
· (1− τ yt )
}
for τ yt ∈ (0, θ],
1− 1
2
· (1− τ yt ) for τ yt ∈
(
θ, 1− 1
ηo
]
,
1− 1
2
·
(
(1− τ yt ) + β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
))
for τ yt ∈
(
1− 1
ηo
, β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
))
, or
τ yt ∈
[
β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
)
+
(
1− 1
ηo
)
, 1
]
.
(6)
10
The third solution, U(τ yt ) = 1−((1− τ yt ) + β · (1− 1/4ηo)) /2, can be given provided that
the set (1− 1/ηo, β · (1− 1/4ηo)) or [β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηo) , 1] is nonempty.
Figure 4 reveals the following two features. First, if τ yt ≤ θ, there can be multiple,
self-fulfilling expectations. If agents expect not to be taxed when old, they choose high
investment, and this leads to a majority of agents who were successful in youth; they
will set τ ot+1 = 0. If, instead, they expect high future taxes, they choose low investment,
and this leads to a majority of the agents who were unsuccessful in youth; they will set
τ ot+1 = 1.
Second, suppose that the decisive voter chooses a sufficiently large τ yt such that τ
y
t ≥
β · (1 − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηo) (see Panels (a) and (c)). In this case, the majority in the
next period will be unsuccessful agents, but they will choose no taxation on the old:
τ ot+1 = 0. The intuition of this result is as follows. Suppose that the proportion of agents
who were unsuccessful in youth is high such that ut ∈ [1− 1/2η0, 1]. By (4), the decisive
voter chooses no taxation on the old: τ ot = 0. Given τ
o
t = 0, if the decisive old voter
chooses a high tax rate on the young, this choice gives young individuals a disincentive
to invest in education, thereby resulting in a higher proportion of unsuccessful agents:
ut+1 ∈ [1 − 1/2η0, 1]. By (4), the tax rate on the old in the next period is given by
τ ot+1 = 0: this satisfies the stationary property of the function T
o.
3.3 The Determination of T y and the Characterization of the
Political Equilibria
Given the characterization of T o and U satisfying equilibrium conditions 1 and 2, re-
spectively, we now consider the political determination of τ yt that satisfies equilibrium
condition 3. Because there are two possible cases of a majority, we introduce correspond-
ing definitions of the political equilibria: a poor-majority equilibrium and a rich-majority
equilibrium. When the majority are poor (i.e., the old who were unsuccessful in youth),
there are two sorts of equilibria: a poor-majority equilibrium where agents expect τ ot+1 = 0
and choose τ yt to induce a majority of poor at time t+1, and a poor-majority equilibrium
where agents expect τ ot+1 = 1 and choose τ
y
t to induce a majority of poor at time t + 1.
When the majority are rich (i.e., the old who were successful in their youth), there is a
rich-majority equilibrium where agents expect τ ot+1 = 0 and choose τ
y
t to induce a majority
of rich at time t+ 1.
We first characterize a poor-majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old.
Proposition 1
(i) Suppose that β ≤ (2/ηo − 1)/(1 − 1/4ηo) holds. There exists a set of poor-majority
equilibria with no taxation on the old such that ∀t, T o is given by (4), U(τ yt ) is given
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by (6), and T y = (1 + β · (1− 1/4ηo)) /2. The equilibrium outcome is unique, such
that ∀t, τ yt = (1 + β · (1− 1/4ηo)) /2, τ ot = 0, ut = 1− (1 + β · (1− 1/4ηo)) /4, and
2st = {1 + β · (1− 1/4ηo)}2/8.
(ii) Suppose that β > (2/ηo − 1)/(1 − 1/4ηo), β ≥ {ηo/4 − (1 − 1/ηo)}/(1 − 1/4ηo),
and β ≤ (1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo) hold. There exists a set of poor-majority equilibria
with no taxation on the old such that ∀t, T o is given by (4), U(τ yt ) is given by
(6), and T y = β · (1 − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηo). The equilibrium outcome is unique,
such that ∀t, τ yt = β · (1 − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηo), τ ot = 0, ut = 1 − 1/2ηo, and
2st = {β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηo)}/2ηo.
Proof. See the Appendix.
[Figure 5 about here.]
The area P.1(i) in Figure 5 indicates the set of parameters (β, ηo) satisfying the
equilibrium condition in Proposition 1(i). The assumption of Proposition 1(i), β ≤
(2/ηo − 1)/(1 − 1/4ηo), implies that it is rational for the decisive voter to choose an
interior solution τ yt = argmaxτyt ∈[0,1] Z(τ
y
t , 0) = (1 + β · (1− 1/4ηo))/2 under the expecta-
tion of τ ot+1 = 0. The young are taxed at the top of the Laffer curve, conditional on their
expectation of no taxation when old (see Panel (a) of Figure 6).
[Figure 6 about here.]
The area P.1(ii) in Figure 5 illustrates the set of parameters (β, ηo) satisfying the
equilibrium condition in Proposition 1(ii). The first assumption of Proposition 1(ii),
β > (2/ηo − 1)/(1 − 1/4ηo), implies that the interior solution is irrational: the decisive
voter is unable to set the interior solution but is able to set a corner solution τ yt =
β · (1 − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηo). Under this situation, there are (at most) two alternative
options that may dominate the corner solution: voting that induces a future majority of
poor (unsuccessful) by setting τ yt = argmaxZ(τ
y
t , 1) = 1/2; and voting that induces a
future majority of rich (successful) by setting τ yt = β·(1−1/4ηo) or τ yt = θ(≤ β·(1−1/4ηo)).
These alternatives cannot dominate the corner solution if they provide less tax revenue
from the young; that is, the second and third assumptions in Proposition 1(ii) hold.
As illustrated in Figure 5, given the discount factor β, the poor-majority equilibrium
with no taxation on the old requires a low ηo, i.e., a low cost of a second chance. A
low ηo implies a high probability of being successful in old age, which gives individuals a
disincentive to invest in education in youth. The unsuccessful agents form a majority, but
they do not support a high tax rate (i.e., 100% taxation) on the old because of the hope for
upward mobility through a second chance. The unsuccessful agents take into account the
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fact that with a high probability they can move up the income distribution and therefore
be harmed by the high tax rate. Hence, given the low cost of a second chance, there is a
unique political equilibrium outcome that supports the POUM hypothesis.
Next, we provide a characterization of a poor-majority equilibrium with 100% taxation
on the old. For this characterization, we introduce a critical level of θ, θ˜, such that
Z(1/2, 1) ≷ Z(θ, 0) if and only if θ ≶ θ˜, where:
θ˜(β, ηo) ≡
1 + β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
)
−
√
β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
)
·
{
β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
)
+ 2
}
2
.
Proposition 2
Suppose that (i) (1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo) < β ≤ (1 − 1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo) or (ii) β ≤
(1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo) and β < {ηo/4− (1− 1/ηo)}/(1− 1/4ηo). Given the expectation
of θ ∈ (0, θ˜), there exists a set of poor-majority equilibria with 100% taxation on
the old such that ∀t, T o is given by (4), U(τ yt ) is given by (6), and T y = 1/2. The
equilibrium outcome is unique and such that ∀t, τ yt = 1/2, τ ot = 1, ut = 3/4, and
2st = 3/8.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The area P.2 in Figure 5 indicates the set of parameters that attains a poor-majority
equilibrium with 100% taxation on the old. From this figure, we can see that β ≤ (1 −
1/ηo)/(1−1/4ηo) is a necessary condition for the existence of a poor-majority equilibrium
with 100% taxation on the old. In order to understand the role of this necessary condition,
suppose alternatively that β > (1− 1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo) holds. In this case, it is rational for
the decisive voter to set τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo) under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0. Because
the condition β > (1−1/ηo)/(1−1/4ηo) is rewritten as Z (β · (1− 1/4ηo), 0) > Z(1/2, 1),
setting τ yt = 1/2 under the expectation of τ
o
t+1 = 0 is not sustained as an equilibrium.
Based on this argument, we suppose that β ≤ (1−1/ηo)/(1−1/4ηo) holds, and we seek
additional conditions that ensure the existence of a poor-majority equilibrium with 100%
taxation on the old. Under the current situation, there are at most two alternative options
that may dominate the choice of τ yt = 1/2: setting τ
y
t = θ(≤ β · (1 − 1/4ηo)) under the
expectation of τ ot+1 = 0 and setting τ
y
t = β · (1−1/4ηo)+(1−1/ηo) under the expectation
of τ ot+1 = 0 (see Panel (b) of Figure 6). The condition θ ∈ (0, θ˜) implies that the former
alternative provides less tax revenue, condition (i) in Proposition 2 implies that the latter
alternative is irrational, and condition (ii) implies that the latter alternative is rational
but provides less tax revenue. Therefore, given θ ∈ (0, θ˜), the choice of τ yt = 1/2 under
the expectation of τ ot+1 = 1 is sustained as an equilibrium when the one of conditions (i)
and (ii) hold.
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As illustrated in Figure 5, the condition given in Proposition 2 requires a low value of
β and a high value of ηo. First, a low value of β implies that agents attach a low weight to
the utility in their old age, thereby having a weak incentive to invest in education in their
youth. This results in a larger number of the old who were unsuccessful in youth, thereby
leading to a majority of the poor. Second, a high value of ηo implies a low probability of
being successful in old age for the old who were unsuccessful in their youth. This provides
them with a low prospect of upward mobility through a second chance and gives them an
incentive to prefer 100% taxation on the rich old. Therefore, given a set of a low β and
a high ηo satisfying the conditions in Proposition 2, there exists a unique poor-majority
equilibrium featuring 100% taxation on the old.
Finally, we provide the condition for the existence of a rich-majority equilibrium.
Proposition 3
(i) Suppose that β > max{(1/ηo)/(1−1/4ηo), (1−1/ηo)/(1−1/4ηo)} holds. There exists
a set of rich-majority equilibria such that ∀t, T o is given by (4), U(τ yt ) is given by
(6), and T y = β · (1− 1/4ηo). The equilibrium outcome is unique and such that ∀t,
τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo), τ ot = 0, ut = 1/2, and 2st = β · (1− 1/4ηo)/2.
(ii) Suppose that β > (1/ηo)/(1−1/4ηo), β ≥ (1/4)/(1−1/4ηo) and β ≤ (1−1/ηo)/(1−
1/4ηo) holds. There exists a set of rich-majority equilibria such that ∀t, T o is given
by (4), U(τ yt ) is given by (6), and T
y = θ ∈ [θ˜, β · (1 − 1/4ηo)]. The equilibrium
outcome is indeterminate, such that ∀t, τ yt = θ, τ ot = 0, ut = 1 − (1 − θ + β · (1 −
1/4ηo))/2, and 2st = (1− θ + β · (1− 1/4ηo))θ/2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The area P.3(i) in Figure 5 indicates the set of parameters (β, ηo) satisfying the equi-
librium condition in Proposition 3(i). The assumption β > (1− 1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo) implies
that it is rational for voters to set τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo) under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0.
When this choice is available, there are at most two alternatives that may dominate
the current choice: setting τ yt = 1/2 under the expectation of τ
o
t+1 = 1 and setting
τ yt = (1 + β · (1− 1/4ηo)) /2 or τ yt = β · (1 − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηo) under the expectation
τ ot+1 = 0. The first alternative always provides less tax revenue; the second alternative
is irrational under the assumption of β > (1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo). Therefore, the choice of
τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo) under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0 is sustained as an equilibrium when
the condition in Proposition 3(i) holds.
The area P.3(ii) in Figure 5 indicates the set of parameters (β, ηo) satisfying the
equilibrium condition in Proposition 3(ii). The third assumption β ≤ (1−1/ηo)/(1−1/4ηo)
implies that it is irrational for voters to set τ yt = β · (1 − 1/4ηo) under the expectation
14
of τ ot+1 = 0; the first assumption β > (1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo) implies that it is irrational for
voters to set τ yt = (1 + β · (1− 1/4ηo)) /2 or τ yt = β · (1 − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηo) under the
expectation τ ot+1 = 0. The remaining alternative is to set τ
y
t = 1/2 under the expectation
of τ ot+1 = 1. This alternative provides less tax revenue than the current choice if Z(θ, 0) ≥
Z(1/2, 1), i.e., if θ ∈ [θ˜, β · (1 − 1/4ηo)]. This set is nonempty if the second assumption,
β ≥ (1/4)/(1−1/4ηo), holds. Therefore, given θ ∈ [θ˜, β · (1−1/4ηo)], the choice of τ yt = θ
under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0 is sustained as an equilibrium when the condition in
Proposition 3(ii) holds.
The next proposition summarizes the results established thus far. The proof of this
proposition is immediately obvious from Figure 5.
Proposition 4
(i) If β ∈ [{ηo/4 − (1 − 1/ηo)}/(1 − 1/4ηo), (1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo)], there exists a unique
poor-majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old as in Proposition 1.
(ii) If β > max{1/ηo/(1 − 1/4ηo), (1 − 1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo)}, there exists a unique rich-
majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old as in Proposition 3(i).
(iii) If β > (1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo), β ≥ (1/4)/(1 − 1/4ηo) and β < (1 − 1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo),
the equilibrium is indeterminate. There exists both a poor-majority equilibrium with
100% taxation on the old as in Proposition 2 and a set of rich-majority equilibria
as in Proposition 3(ii).
(iv) If β < {ηo/4 − (1 − 1/ηo)}/(1 − 1/4ηo) and β ≤ (1/4)/(1 − 1/4ηo), there exists a
unique poor-majority equilibrium with 100% taxation on the old as in Proposition 2.
By focusing on the parameter ηo, we now provide an interpretation of the result estab-
lished in Proposition 4. To facilitate understanding, we assume the following economic
environment. We take a generation to be 20 years in length because the current model
assumes that agents work for both periods of their life. The first and the second periods
correspond to, for example, ages 21–40 and 41–60 years, respectively. Our selection of
β is based on the single period discount rate provided by Kydland and Prescott (1982)
of 0.96. Because the agents in our model plan over generations that span 20 years, we
discount the future by (0.96)20.
Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium properties under the current economic environ-
ment. There is a threshold level of ηo, 2.5124, which determines the equilibrium prop-
erties. When ηo is below the threshold level, the unsuccessful agents can succeed in a
second chance with a high probability. This implies that unsuccessful agents have a high
prospect of upward mobility in the future, which gives the young a weak incentive to
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invest in education. Therefore, a low ηo leads to a large number of agents who were un-
successful in youth. They prefer no taxation on the old because given a high probability
of being successful in old age, they wish to avoid being taxed. The POUM hypothesis is
supported in this case.
When ηo is above the threshold level, there is no equilibrium that supports the POUM
hypothesis. This is because given a high cost of a second chance, there is no possibility of
changing status from poor to rich by attempting a second chance. The agents who were
unsuccessful in youth are expected to remain poor in old age. Therefore, for ηo > 2.5124,
there is a poor-majority equilibrium with 100% taxation on rich old agents. However,
there is also a rich-majority equilibrium because of the multiple self-fulfilling expecta-
tions. Which particular equilibrium is realized depends on the expectations of agents.
Expectations of 100% (0%) taxation on the old lead to low (high) educational investment
and thus a majority of the poor (rich); the majority of the poor (rich) then support 100%
(0%) taxation and thus high (low) redistribution.
4 Upward Mobility and Inequality
This section examines the correlation between upward mobility and inequality. Section 4.1
undertakes a numerical analysis of upward mobility and inequality. Section 4.2 explores
the empirical implications of the numerical results.
4.1 Numerical Analysis
We define the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality in the current framework and
then undertake a numerical analysis under the economic environment of β = (0.96)20.
We calculate the Gini coefficient in terms of after tax-and-transfer income (see the Ap-
pendix for the method of calculation). Figure 7 illustrates the numerical results of the
upward mobility rate (i.e., the probability of being successful in old age, eo) and the Gini
coefficient.
The result illustrated in Figure 7 provides the following prediction for upward mobility
and inequality. When the cost is low, such that ηo < 2.5124, the economy attains a unique
poor-majority equilibrium featuring high levels of upward mobility and inequality. The
low cost of a second chance then enhances the upward mobility of unsuccessful agents.
However, it gives young individuals a disincentive to invest in education, which results in
a greater number of unsuccessful young agents and thus a larger level of inequality among
them. Therefore, the lower cost of a second chance results in higher levels of upward
mobility and inequality.
[Figure 7 about here.]
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When the cost of a second chance is high, such that ηo ≥ 2.5124, the economy at-
tains multiple equilibria depending on the expectations of agents: one is a poor-majority
equilibrium featuring lower levels of upward mobility and inequality; the other is a rich-
majority equilibrium featuring higher levels of upward mobility and inequality. In the
poor-majority equilibrium, agents expect higher redistribution in the future, and this ex-
pectation is realized as 100% taxation on the old. The upward mobility rate becomes zero,
and thus old agents are equal in the sense that all of them obtain st units of after tax-
and-transfer income. In contrast, in the rich-majority equilibrium, agents expect lower
redistribution in the future, and this expectation is realized as no taxation on the old.
The upward mobility rate is given by eot = 1/2ηo, and thus there is inequality among old
agents. Therefore, the rich-majority equilibrium attains higher levels of upward mobility
and inequality compared with the poor-majority equilibrium.
A noteworthy feature of the result in Figure 7 is that a decrease in ηo around the
threshold level of ηo = 2.5124 leads to a sharp increase in inequality. The mechanism
behind this is as follows. The objective of the decisive voter is to maximize tax revenue
from the young. This objective is achieved by: (i) the larger size of the tax base associated
with a lower tax rate that enhances educational investment by the young, or (ii) the smaller
size of the tax base associated with a higher tax rate that gives the young a disincentive
to invest in education. When ηo is above the threshold level, the young have an incentive
to invest in education because they expect a lower probability of being successful in old
age. The decisive voter can expect a large number of successful young agents and thus
attempts to maximize the tax revenue from the young based on the first option. However,
when ηo is below the threshold level, the young have a disincentive to invest in education
because they expect upward mobility in the future with a high probability. The decisive
voter then maximizes revenue from the young based on the second option. Therefore, at
ηo = 2.5124, a reduction in ηo leads to a discontinuous increase in the tax rate on the
young and a discontinuous decrease in the number of successful young agents (see Figure
8), both of which cause a sharp increase in inequality.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Another noteworthy feature is that countries included in the rich-majority equilibria
could present different patterns of mobility and inequality. To understand this, let us
consider the effects of θ and ηo on mobility and inequality in the rich-majority equilibria.
The parameter θ, representing the expectations of agents, has no effect on mobility but
has a critical effect on inequality via taxation on the young. The parameter ηo, represent-
ing the cost of a second chance, has a primary effect on mobility but has a minor effect
on inequality. These effects imply that depending on θ and ηo, the rich-majority equilib-
rium demonstrates a positive or a negative relation between mobility and inequality. For
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example, a country with a low ηo features a high level of mobility but either a high or a
low level of inequality depending on the expectations of agents.
4.2 Empirical Implications
The result in Figure 7 shows that the political economy tends to generate a positive
correlation between mobility and inequality as in Quadrini (1999) but may present various
patterns of mobility and inequality in the rich-majority equilibria. In this section, we
consider the scatter plot of upward mobility and inequality illustrated in Figure 1, and
show that the correlation in Figure 1 is in line with the model predictions.8
As shown in Figure 1, among the eight countries presented, the United States displays
the highest upward mobility for workers aged 25–34 years, the second-highest upward
mobility for workers aged 35–49 years, and the highest inequality. Finland shows the low-
est upward mobility for workers aged 25–34 years, the second-lowest upward mobility for
workers aged 35–49 years, and the lowest inequality. The remaining six countries gener-
ally show lower levels of upward mobility and inequality when compared with the United
States, and higher levels of upward mobility and inequality when compared with Finland.
These observations suggest a positive correlation between mobility and inequality.
However, there are some exceptions to this view: for instance, high mobility and low
inequality are observed in Sweden for workers aged 25–34 years, and in Denmark and Swe-
den for workers aged 35–49 years. Empirical work by Aaberge et al. (2002) supports this
observation by showing that inequality is greater in the United States than in Scandinavia,
even though the pattern of mobility is remarkably similar. One possible interpretation of
this finding is that Scandinavia is represented by the rich-majority equilibrium featuring
high mobility and low inequality caused by low levels of θ and ηo. Therefore, the various
patterns of mobility and inequality in the rich-majority equilibria, which were not shown
in Quadrini (1999), are key factors in explaining the relation between the United States
and Scandinavia.
From Figures 1 and 7, we can draw some further inferences about the relative ηo
and θ across countries included in the rich-majority equilibria. For example, Sweden
and the United Kingdom feature low levels of ηo because they show high levels of upward
mobility. However, they might have different expectations of future taxation because they
8An alternative way of connecting the model predictions to empirical evidence is to focus on tax burden.
However, this is not necessarily appropriate because the current model has the following limitations. First,
the binary choice of the tax rate on the old makes the model analytically tractable but fails to demonstrate
realistic tax rates. Second, the preferences of the young are not reflected in the political determination
of the tax rate on the young because the model assumes that the young do not participate in voting.
These limitations imply that the tax rates analytically derived from the model do not fit the empirical
data well. Therefore, we have decided to observe the inequality in terms of after-tax income instead of
directly focusing on tax rates.
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show substantial differences in inequality. As another example, Germany and Italy may
feature high levels of ηo because they show low levels of upward mobility. However, they
might also have different expectations of θ as the data in Figure 1 shows that inequality
is lower in Germany than in Italy.
Our analysis of inequality and intragenerational mobility supplements the analysis of
inequality and intergenerational mobility in Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2007).
They developed a model including intergenerational mobility from parents to children
through altruistic investment in education, and showed that a reduction in the cost of
upward mobility has the primary effect of enhancing upward mobility. This is in common
with Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2007) and the current analysis. However, the
secondary effect and its implications differ completely from those in the current paper. In
Hassler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira (2007), the secondary effect is a decrease in the gain
from education. This effect decreases upward mobility. They showed that the primary
effect generally overrides the secondary effect so that a reduction in the cost of education
results in improvements in both upward mobility and equality (see Proposition 3 in Has-
sler, Rodriguez Mora and Zeira, 2007). In contrast, in our framework, the secondary effect
provides young individuals with a disincentive to invest in education, and this overrides
the primary effect. Therefore, the correlation between inequality and upward mobility
depends on whether the focus is on intragenerational or intergenerational mobility.
5 Welfare Analysis
Based on the analysis given in Section 3, we consider the welfare implications of a second
chance by focusing on the parameter representing the cost of a second chance, ηo. While
policies to decrease ηo benefit old agents who were unsuccessful in youth, they will not
be welfare improving if the agents who were successful in their youth or young agents
are made worse off. To examine the total welfare effect of these policies, we introduce a
Benthamite social welfare function Γ defined by:
Γ(τ y, τ o) = V y(τ y, τ o) + (1− u(τ y, τ o)) · V os(τ y, τ o) + u(τ y, τ o) · V ou(τ y, τ o),
where V os, V ou and V y are given by (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Using this function, we
undertake comparative statics analysis of ηo via numerical examples under the assumption
of β = (0.96)20. We examine the social welfare implications of polices that reduce ηo to
enhance upward mobility, and consider whether a low-cost economy is superior to a high-
cost economy in terms of social welfare.
[Figure 9 about here.]
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We calculate the educational investment by the young, the tax rates on the young
and old, and the utility of each type of agent and social welfare by taking the value of
ηo from one to infinity. We have already presented educational investment by the old in
Figure 7, and the tax rate on the young and the educational investment by the young in
Figure 8. Figure 9 illustrates the expected utility of young agents (Panel (a)), and social
welfare (Panel (b)). We provide an interpretation of the simulation results by focusing
on the parameter ηo. In particular, we consider a larger set of ηo to a smaller set of ηo
in turn and provide the welfare implications of policies that reduce ηo to enhance upward
mobility.
First, consider the case of ηo ∈ [2.5124,∞): there are multiple equilibria. If the
expectation θ is larger than the critical level θ˜, there is an equilibrium where the majority
of voters are the successful agents who prefer τ yt = θ and τ
o
t+1 = 0. However, if the
expectation θ is lower than the critical level θ˜, there is an equilibrium where the majority
of voters are the unsuccessful agents who prefer τ yt = 1/2 and τ
o
t+1 = 1. The former
equilibrium is superior to the latter in terms of social welfare because in the former, the
successful agents benefit from no taxation in their old age.
Second, consider the case of ηo ∈ (1, 2.5124). There is a unique equilibrium where the
majority of voters are the unsuccessful agents who prefer τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo)+ (1− 1/ηo)
or (1 + β · (1− 1/4ηo)) /2 and τ ot+1 = 0. A noteworthy feature is that the current case
may show a lower level of social welfare compared with the case of ηo ∈ [2.5124,∞). In
particular, a decrease in ηo around the threshold level of ηo = 2.5124 leads to a sharp
decrease in social welfare. The mechanism behind this result is as follows. At ηo = 2.5124,
a decrease in ηo produces a discontinuous increase in the tax rate on the young and a
discontinuous decrease in the number of successful young agents. Both of these effects
were explained in Section 4.1. These effects result in a sharp decrease in the expected
utility of the young and thus in social welfare. This result implies that the United States
(as represented by the low-cost economy) may be inferior to some European countries (as
represented by the high-cost economy), at least in terms of social welfare.
The empirical validity of numerical analysis so far can be checked by comparing the
model prediction of the number of successful young agents with the empirical data. We
take the graduation rate in tertiary education (especially tertiary type A programs in-
cluding universities and college) as a proxy variable for the proportion of successful young
agents because we regard education in youth as study at tertiary education institutions.
The graduation rates in 2005 of the countries concerned are as follows: 45.5% for Den-
mark 47.3% for Finland, 19.9% for Germany, 41.0% for Italy, 37.7% for Sweden, 39.4% for
the UK, and 34.2% for the US (OECD, 2007).9 With the second-lowest graduation rate,
9The data for France are not available.
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the US has a lower graduation rate than European countries such as Iceland, Ireland,
the Netherlands and Norway (OECD, 2007). These results imply that it is reasonable to
consider that the US is represented by the low-cost economy featuring a lower graduation
rate whereas some European countries are represented by the high-cost economy featuring
higher graduation rates.
6 Extensions and Further Analysis
The analysis so far has assumed that: (i) the cost function in youth is specified by (ey)2,
and (ii) the same wages are paid to individuals who were successful in youth and individ-
uals who were unsuccessful in youth but became successful in old age. This section briefly
considers how the analysis and the results are changed when each of these assumptions is
relaxed.
6.1 The Generalization of the Investment Cost Function in Youth
The analysis in the previous sections assumed that the investment cost functions in youth
and old age are given by (ey)2 and ηo(e
o)2, respectively. Given these specifications, we
focused on the parameter ηo representing the cost in old age, and analyzed the role of ηo for
the determination of political equilibria. In this subsection, we generalize the investment
cost function in youth by assuming ηy(e
y)2, where ηy(> 0) is a parameter representing the
cost in youth, and we consider the role of ηy for the determination of political equilibria.
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Given the cost functions ηy(e
y)2 and ηo(e
o)2, educational investments in youth and old
age are given by, respectively:
ey∗t (τ
y
t , τ
o
t+1) =
1
2ηy
[
(1− τ yt ) + β
{
(1− τ ot+1)−
1
4ηo
(1− τ ot+1)2
}]
,
e0∗t (τ
o
t ) =
1
2ηo
(1− τ ot ).
A lower value of ηy implies a lower cost in youth, thereby yielding a higher probability
of being successful in youth. However, the value of ηy does not affect the probability of
being successful in old age because the educational cost in youth has no relevance to the
investment in old age.
The equations presented imply that the impact of the cost in youth is limited to the
incentive of educational investment in youth and thus is limited to the determination of
the majority. For cases of high values of ηy, with ηy = 1 as a special case, young indi-
10The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the important role of education
costs in youth.
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viduals have a weak incentive to invest in education; this results in a similar equilibrium
characterization to that presented in Section 3. However, for cases of low values of ηy,
young individuals have a strong incentive to invest in education even if they expect high
tax rates. The economy attains a unique rich-majority equilibrium.11 Therefore, the
generalization of the cost function in youth has no impact on the mobility but has an
effect on the characterization of political equilibria in that a rich-majority equilibrium is
more likely to hold when the cost in youth is lower. Because the focus of this paper is on
upward mobility and its impact on the welfare, the previous sections assumed ηy = 1 and
concentrated on the parameter ηo that affects mobility.
6.2 Experience Premiums
One of the main results in this paper is that an equilibrium exists that supports the POUM
hypothesis: the majority are poor but they support low redistribution because of the hope
of upward mobility in the future. A key to this result is the education disincentive effect
produced by low costs of a second chance in old age. Low costs of a second chance provide
young individuals with a disincentive for educational investment in youth because they
expect that they will become successful in old age with a high probability, even if they
fail in education in their youth.
The education disincentive effect is mitigated when experience premiums are consid-
ered. The analysis so far has assumed that the same wages are paid to individuals who
were successful in youth and individuals who were unsuccessful in youth but became suc-
cessful in old age. However, in the real world, the former would be more experienced than
the latter and thus would receive experience premiums in old age. The experience premi-
ums give young individuals an incentive to invest in education in youth, which mitigates
the education disincentive effect created by low costs of a second chance.12 This raises the
following question: does the model still predict an equilibrium that supports the POUM
hypothesis when experience premiums are considered? In other words, how robust is the
equilibrium that supports the POUM hypothesis in the presence of experience premiums?
In order to answer these questions, we assume here that the old who were successful in
youth receive w(> 1) units of wages in old age: w− 1 units of wages represent experience
premiums. Under this setting, the educational investment in youth is given by:
ey∗t (τ
y
t , τ
o
t+1) =
1
2
[
(1− τ yt ) + β
{
w(1− τ ot+1)−
1
4ηo
(1− τ ot+1)2
}]
.
This equation implies that a higher level of experience premiums results in a larger amount
11Ono and Arawatari (2008) show this result in a model without second chances.
12The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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of educational investment in youth. Given this equation, we obtain the following result
that provides the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that supports the POUM
hypothesis.
Proposition 5
(i) If β ≤ (2/ηow − 1)/(w − 1/4ηo), there exists a poor-majority equilibrium with the
outcome of τ yt = [1+β(w−1/4ηo)]/2, τ ot+1 = 0 and ut+1 = 1−[1+β(w−1/4ηo)]/4(>
1/2).
(ii) If β > (2/ηow − 1)/(w − 1/4ηo), β ≥ {ηow/4 − (1 − 1/ηow)}/(w − 1/4ηo) and
β ≤ (1/ηow)/(w− 1/4ηo), there exists a poor-majority equilibrium with the outcome
of τ yt = β(w − 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηow), τ ot+1 = 0 and ut+1 = 1− 1/2ηow(> 1/2).
Proof. See the supplementary explanation in Section 9.
The first and second statements of Proposition 5 correspond to the first and second
statements of Proposition 1, respectively. Proposition 5 implies that when β is given by
(0.96)20 as in the previous sections, there exists an equilibrium that supports the POUM
hypothesis if ηo satisfies:
13
β = (0.96)20 ≤ 1/ηow
w − 1/4ηo , i.e., ηo ∈
(
1
w
,
w + (0.96)20/4
(0.96)20w
]
.
The set is nonempty if and only if w < 4/3 · (0.96)20 ≈ 1.589. Therefore, the existence of
the equilibrium that supports the POUM hypothesis is ensured as long as the experience
premiums are below 58% of the wage in youth.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a framework for the analysis of the dynamic political economy of
redistribution when agents who failed in education early in life have a second chance for
upward mobility later in life. In this framework, the analysis considers repeated voting
over redistribution policy and provides an analytical characterization of the stationary
Markov-perfect political equilibrium by focusing on the parameter representing the cost of
a second chance. In addition, we undertake a comparative static analysis of this parameter
via numerical example and present how the parameter affects (i) the correlation between
inequality and upward mobility, and (ii) the determination of social welfare.
The results established in this paper are as follows. When the cost of a second chance
is low, there is a unique, poor-majority equilibrium characterized by high levels of up-
ward mobility and inequality with a low tax burden on the decisive voter. Although the
13We assume ηo > 1/w. This assumption corresponds to Assumption 1 with the specification of w = 1.
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majority are the poor who benefit from redistribution, they do not support a high tax
rate because of a hope for upward mobility in the future. This prediction is consistent
with empirical observations on the US economy by Benabou and Ok (2001) and Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005). However, when the cost of a second chance is high, the economy
displays multiple equilibria representing many European countries: one is a rich-majority
equilibrium characterized by higher levels of upward mobility and inequality; the another
is a poor-majority equilibrium characterized by lower levels of upward mobility and in-
equality. Furthermore, mobility and inequality are lower in the high-cost economy than
in the low-cost economy representing the United States. Based on this characterization of
political equilibrium, we investigate the welfare implications of upward mobility and show
that in terms of social welfare, the low-cost economy featuring high upward mobility may
be inferior to the high-cost economy featuring low upward mobility. This implies that
enhancing upward mobility is not necessarily good for the economy.
In order to obtain these results, we simplified the analysis by adopting a simple lump-
sum transfer scheme. We did not consider alternative policy methods, for example, trans-
fers targeted at the elderly or the poor. In addition, we abstracted from downward mobil-
ity in the analysis. Furthermore, some results are based on numerical analysis because of
the difficulty in solving the model analytically. However, the current paper does provide
a framework for understanding: (i) cross-country differences in inequality and upward
mobility from the viewpoint of political economy, and (ii) the role of upward mobility
from the viewpoint of social welfare.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i) Suppose that under the assumption of β ≤ (2/ηo − 1)/(1− 1/4ηo), agents know that
τ yt = (1 + β · (1− 1/4ηo))/2 and expect τ ot+1 = 0. Then:
1− ey∗
(
1 + β · (1− 1/4ηo)
2
, 0
)
= ut+1 = 1− 1
4
(
1 + β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
))
.
Because the assumption β ≤ (2/ηo−1)/(1−1/4ηo) is rewritten as 1−(1+β·(1−1/4ηo))/4 ≥
1 − 1/2ηo, ut+1 ≥ 1 − 1/2ηo holds for all t. By (4), this implies that τ ot+1 = 0, fulfilling
initial expectations. Therefore, under the assumption of β ≤ (2/ηo−1)/(1−1/4ηo), there
exists a poor-majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old if the decisive voter finds
it optimal to set τ yt = (1 + β · (1− 1/4ηo))/2.
To establish that setting τ yt = (1+ β · (1− 1/4ηo))/2 is optimal for the decisive voter,
we note the following properties of the function Z : (i) Z(τ yt , 0) is concave in τ
y
t and
is maximized at τ yt = argmaxτyt ∈[0,1] Z(τ
y
t , 0) = (1 + β · (1 − 1/4ηo))/2; (ii) Z(τ yt , 0) >
Z(τ yt , 1)∀τ yt ∈ [0, 1]. These properties imply that setting τ yt = (1 + β · (1 − 1/4ηo))/2
is optimal if this setting is rational under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0, i.e., if β · (1 −
1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηo) ≤ (1 + β · (1 − 1/4ηo))/2 ≤ 1. The first inequality is rewritten as
β ≤ (2/ηo−1)/(1−1/4ηo), which is equivalent to the current assumption; and the second
inequality always holds under the assumption of β ∈ [0, 1] and ηo > 1 (Assumption 1).
(ii) Suppose that at time t, agents know that τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo)+ (1− 1/ηo) and expect
τ ot+1 = 0. Then:
1− ey∗
(
β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
)
+
(
1− 1
ηo
)
, 0
)
= ut+1 = 1− 1
2ηo
.
By (4), this implies that τ ot+1 = 0, fulfilling initial expectations. Therefore, a poor-majority
equilibrium exists if the decisive voter finds it optimal to set τ yt = β ·(1−1/4ηo)+(1−1/ηo).
To establish that setting τ yt = β · (1 − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηo) is optimal for the decisive
voter, we first note that setting τ yt = (1+ β · (1− 1/4ηo))/2 is not rational under the first
assumption:
β > (2/ηo − 1)/(1− 1/4ηo). (7)
Given this condition, we consider the following two cases: β > (1− 1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo) and
β ≤ (1− 1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo).
First, suppose that a set of parameters satisfies β · (1− 1/4ηo) > (1− 1/ηo), i.e.:
β > (1− 1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo), (8)
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as illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 4. Under this situation, the relevant payoff function
is Z(τ yt , 0) or Z(τ
y
t , 1) for τ
y
t ∈ (0, θ], Z(τ yt , 1) for τ yt ∈ (θ, 1 − 1/ηo], and Z(τ yt , 0) for
τ yt ∈ (1− 1/ηo, β · (1− 1/4ηo)]. Given the properties of the payoff function demonstrated
in the proof of Proposition 1(i), an alternative option is to choose τ yt = β · (1 − 1/4ηo)
under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0. Thus, under the assumptions of (7) and (8), setting
τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηo) is sustained as an equilibrium if Z(β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1−
1/ηo), 0) ≥ Z(β · (1− 1/4ηo), 0), i.e., if:
β ≤ 1/ηo
1− 1/4ηo . (9)
Second, suppose that a set of parameters satisfies β · (1− 1/4ηo) ≤ (1− 1/ηo), i.e.:
β ≤ (1− 1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo), (10)
as illustrated in Panel (c) of Figure 4. Under this situation, the relevant payoff function is
Z(τ yt , 0) or Z(τ
y
t , 1) for τ
y
t ∈ (0, θ] and Z(τ yt , 1) for τ yt ∈ (θ, 1−1/ηo]. Given the properties
of the payoff function, there are two alternatives: setting τ yt = θ(≤ β · (1 − 1/4ηo))
under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0 and setting τ
y
t = argmaxZ(τ
y
t , 1) = 1/2 under the
expectation of τ ot+1 = 1. Thus, under the assumptions of (7) and (10), setting τ
y
t =
β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηo) is sustained as an equilibrium if:
Z(β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηo), 0) ≥ Z(β · (1− 1/4ηo), 0),
and:
Z(β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηo), 0) ≥ Z(1/2, 1),
that is, if:
β ≤ 1/ηo
1− 1/4ηo and β ≥
ηo/4− (1− 1/ηo)
1− 1/4ηo . (11)
In sum, there exists a poor-majority equilibrium featured by τ yt = β ·(1−1/4ηo)+(1−
1/ηo) and τ
o
t+1 = 0 if (7), (8) and (9) hold or if (7), (10) and (11) hold. These conditions
are reduced to (7) and (11). ¥
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Under the set of parameters given in Proposition 2, ηo > 2, i.e., 1/2 < 1− 1/ηo holds (see
Figure 5). This implies that given the expectations of τ ot+1 = 1 and θ < 1/2, agents can
choose τ yt to attain the top of the Laffer curve Z(τ
y
t , 1) : argmaxZ(τ
y
t , 1) = 1/2.
Suppose that at time t, agents know that τ yt = 1/2 and expect that τ
o
t+1 = 1. Then,
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1 − ey∗(1/2, 1) = ut+1 = 3/4. Because the condition in Proposition 2 ensures that ηo >
2, ut+1 = 3/4 ∈ (1/2, 1 − 1/2ηo] holds for all t. By (4), this implies that τ ot+1 = 1,
fulfilling initial expectations. Therefore, there exists a poor-majority equilibrium with
100% taxation on the old if the decisive voter finds it optimal to set τ yt = 1/2.
To establish that setting τ yt = 1/2 is optimal for the decisive voter, we consider
the following two cases: β > (1 − 1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo) and β ≤ (1 − 1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo).
First, suppose that a set of parameters satisfies β · (1 − 1/4ηo) > (1 − 1/ηo), i.e., β >
(1−1/ηo)/(1−1/4ηo) as illustrated in Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4. Under this situation,
setting τ yt = β ·(1−1/4ηo) is rational under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0 (see Panels (a) and
(b) of Figure 4). It holds that Z(β·(1−1/4ηo), 0) ≥ Z(1/2, 1)⇔ β ≥ (1−1/ηo)/(1−1/4ηo),
implying that setting τ yt = 1/2 is not sustained as an equilibrium.
Alternatively, suppose that a set of parameters satisfies β · (1 − 1/4ηo) ≤ (1 − 1/ηo),
i.e.:
β ≤ (1− 1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo), (12)
as illustrated in Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 4. Under this situation, there are two
alternative options: (i) setting τ yt = θ(≤ β · (1−1/4ηo)) under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0
(see Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 4); and (ii) setting τ yt = β·(1−1/4ηo)+(1−1/ηo) under the
expectation of τ ot+1 = 0 provided that (1+β ·(1−1/4ηo))/2 < β ·(1−1/4ηo)+(1−1/ηo) ≤ 1
holds (Panel (c) of Figure 4).14 Therefore, under the condition of (12), setting τ yt = 1/2
is sustained as an equilibrium if:
Z(θ, 0) < Z
(
1
2
, 1
)
and 1 < β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
)
+
(
1− 1
ηo
)
, (13)
or:
Z(θ, 0) < Z
(
1
2
, 1
)
, 1+β·(1−1/4ηo)
2
< β ·
(
1− 1
4ηo
)
+
(
1− 1
ηo
)
≤ 1,
and Z (β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηo), 0) < Z
(
1
2
, 1
)
.
(14)
The conditions in (13) are reduced to:
θ < θ˜ and β > (1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo), (15)
and the condition in (14) is reduced to:
θ < θ˜, β ≤ (1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo) and β < {ηo/4− (1− 1/ηo)}/(1− 1/4ηo), (16)
where θ˜ is defined by:θ˜(β, ηo) ≡
1+β·(1− 14ηo )−
q
β·(1− 14ηo )·{β·(1− 14ηo )+2}
2
. From Figure 5, we
can see that the second and third conditions in (16) imply (12). Thus, given θ < θ˜, there
14If β · (1 − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηo) ≤ (1 + β · (1 − 1/4ηo))/2 holds, setting τyt = (1 + β · (1 − 1/4ηo))/2
under the expectation of τo+1 = 0 dominates all the other options.
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exists an equilibrium featured by τ yt = 1/2 and τ
o
t+1 = 1 if (12) and (15) hold; or if (16)
holds. ¥
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Suppose that at time t, agents know that τ yt = β · (1 − 1/4ηo) and expect that
τ ot+1 = 0. Then, 1 − ey∗(β · (1 − 1/4ηo), 0) = ut+1 = 1/2. By (4), this implies that
τ ot+1 = 0, fulfilling initial expectations. Therefore, there exists a rich-majority equilibrium
with τ yt = β · (1 − 1/4ηo) and τ ot+1 = 0 if the decisive voter finds it optimal to set
τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo).
To establish that setting τ yt = β·(1−1/4ηo) is optimal for the decisive voter, we consider
the following two cases: β · (1− 1/4ηo) > (1− 1/ηo) and β · (1− 1/4ηo) ≤ (1− 1/ηo).
First, suppose that a set of parameters satisfies β · (1− 1/4ηo) > (1− 1/ηo), i.e.:
β > (1− 1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo), (17)
as illustrated in Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4. If β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηo) ≤ 1, i.e., if
β ≤ (1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo), there is an alternative option τ yt = β · (1 − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηo)
under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0 (see Panel (a) of Figure 4). This dominates the initial
choice τ yt = β · (1 − 1/4ηo) because β ≤ (1/ηo)/(1 − 1/4ηo) is equivalent to Z(β · (1 −
1/4ηo)+ (1− 1/ηo), 0) ≥ Z(β · (1− 1/4ηo), 0). However, if β · (1− 1/4ηo)+ (1− 1/ηo) > 1,
i.e., if:
β > (1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo), (18)
it is irrational for voters to set τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηo) under the expectation of
τ ot+1 = 0. An alternative option is to set τ
y
t = argmaxZ(τ
y
t , 1) = 1/2 or τ
y
t = 1 − 1/ηo
under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 1. Given the properties of the payoff function, this
alternative is dominated by the initial choice. Therefore, there exists a rich-majority
equilibrium featured by τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo) and τ ot+1 = 0 if (17) and (18) hold.
Second, suppose that a set of parameters satisfies:
β ≤ (1− 1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo),
as illustrated in Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 4. In this case, the relevant payoff function
is Z(τ yt , 0) or Z(τ
y
t , 1) for τ
y
t ∈ (0, θ] and Z(τ yt , 1) for τ yt ∈ (θ, 1− 1/ηo]. Therefore, there
is no choice of τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo) in this case.
(ii) First, suppose that a set of parameters satisfies β · (1 − 1/4ηo) > (1 − 1/ηo), i.e.,
β > (1−1/ηo)/(1−1/4ηo) as illustrated in Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4. It is possible to
set τ yt = θ(< 1− 1/ηo) under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0. However, it is also possible to
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set τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo) under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0, and this alternative dominates
the initial one because Z(β · (1− 1/4ηo), 0) > Z(θ, 0) holds for all t. Therefore, there is no
rich-majority equilibrium featured by τ yt = θ and τ
o
t+1 = 0 if β > (1− 1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo).
Next, suppose that a set of parameters satisfies β · (1− 1/4ηo) ≤ (1− 1/ηo), i.e.:
β ≤ (1− 1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo), (19)
as illustrated in Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 4. It is possible to set τ yt = θ(< 1−1/ηo) under
the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0. If β · (1− 1/4ηo)+ (1− 1/ηo) ≤ 1 holds (see Panel (c)), there
is an alternative option of setting τ yt = β · (1− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηo) under the expectation
of τ ot+1 = 0: this dominates the initial option. However, if: β · (1−1/4ηo)+(1−1/ηo) > 1,
i.e., if:
β > (1/ηo)/(1− 1/4ηo), (20)
as illustrated in Panel (d) of Figure 3, an alternative option is to set τ yt = argmaxZ(τ
y
t , 1) =
1/2 under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 1. Setting τ
y
t = θ is sustained as an equilibrium if
Z(θ, 0) ≥ Z(1/2, 1), i.e., if θ ≥ θ˜. Therefore, under the condition of (19) and (20), there
exists a rich-majority equilibrium featured by τ yt = θ and τ
o
t+1 = 0 if θ is set within the
range [θ˜, β · (1 − 1/4ηo)]. This set is nonempty if and only if θ˜ ≤ β · (1 − 1/4ηo), i.e., if
and only if β ≥ (1/4)/(1− 1/4ηo). ¥
8.4 The Gini Index
This section provides an explanation for the calculation of the Gini Index in Section
4. We calculate the Gini index in terms of the after-tax-and-transfer income. In each
period, there are three types of agents: young rich agents with per capita income given by
(1− τ yt )+ st, old rich agents with per capita income given by (1− τ ot )+ st, and young and
old poor agents with per capita income given by st. Panel (a) of Figure 10 summarizes
information about per capita income, the size of the population and the total income for
each type of agent. For an equilibrium with τ ot = 0, per capita income levels are ranked
by (1− τ ot ) + st > (1− τ yt ) + st > st. For an equilibrium with τ ot = 1, per capita income
levels are ranked by (1 − τ yt ) + st > (1 − τ ot ) + st > st. Based on this rank, we can
illustrate the Lorenz curve and calculate the corresponding Gini coefficient. Panel (b)
of Figure 10 illustrates an example of the Lorenz curve for the equilibrium with τ ot = 0.
The Gini coefficient is calculated by A/(A+B), where A is the shaded area and B is the
non-shaded area in Panel (b). The Gini index is equal to the Gini coefficient multiplied
by 100.
[Figure 10 about here.]
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9 Supplementary Explanation for Section 6.2
We modify the model presented in Section 2 by assuming that the old who were successful
in youth earn experience premiums in old age. Specifically, they earn a wage w, which is
greater than one: w > 1. Under this setting, the expected utility functions of agents alive
at time t are given as follows:
V ost = w(1− τ ot ) + st,
V out = e
o
t · (1− τ ot )− ηo · (eot )2 + st,
V yt = e
y
t · (1− τ yt )− (eyt )2 + st
+ β
[
eyt · w(1− τ ot+1) + (1− eyt )
{
eot+1 · (1− τ ot+1)− ηo · (eot+1)2
}
+ st+1
]
.
The optimal investments by the old and the young are given by, respectively:
eo∗(τ ot ) =
(1− τ ot )
2ηo
,
ey∗(τ yt , τ
o
t+1) =
1
2
·
[
(1− τ yt ) + β
{
w(1− τ ot+1)−
1
4ηo
· (1− τ ot+1)2
}]
.
We make the following assumption.
Assumption A: (i) ηow > 1; (ii) βw < 1.
The first assumption includes Assumption 1 as a special case of w = 1. The second
assumption ensures that ey∗(τ yt , τ
o
t+1) is set within the range (0, 1).
The government budget constraint is given by 2st = W (τ
o
t , ut) + Z(τ
y
t , τ
o
t+1), where
W (τ ot , ut) ≡ [(1− ut)w + ut · eo∗(τ ot )] · τ ot is the revenue financed by the rich old agents,
and Z(τ yt , τ
o
t+1) ≡ ey∗(τ yt , τ ot+1) · τ yt is the tax revenue financed by the rich young agents.
The first equilibrium condition is T o(ut) = argmaxτot ∈[0,1]W
dec(τ ot , ut) (dec = os, ou),
where:
W dec(τ ot , ut) =
{
W os ≡ w(1− τ ot ) + 12 ·W (τ ot , ut) if ut ≤ 1/2,
W ou ≡ (1−τot )2
4ηo
+ 1
2
·W (τ ot , ut) if ut > 1/2.
After some calculation, we obtain the mapping that satisfies equilibrium condition 1 as
follows:
T o(ut) =
{
0 if ut ≤ 1/2 or 1− 1/2ηow ≤ ut ≤ 1,
1 if 1/2 < ut ≤ 1− 1/2ηow.
(21)
The second equilibrium condition is given by:
U(τ yt ) = 1−
1
2
·
[
(1− τ yt ) + β ·
{
w (1− T o(U(τ yt )))−
1
4ηo
· (1− T o(U(τ yt )))2
}]
,
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where T o(·) ∈ {0, 1} is given by (21). After some calculation, we obtain the following
solution:
U(τ yt ) =
{
1− 1
2
·
(
(1− τ yt ) + β ·
(
w − 1
4ηo
))
, 1− 1
2
· (1− τ yt )
}
for τ yt ∈ (0, θ],
1− 1
2
· (1− τ yt ) for τ yt ∈
(
θ, 1− 1
ηow
]
,
1− 1
2
·
(
(1− τ yt ) + β ·
(
w − 1
4ηo
))
for τ yt ∈
(
1− 1
ηow
, β ·
(
w − 1
4ηo
))
, or
τ yt ∈
[
β ·
(
w − 1
4ηo
)
+
(
1− 1
ηow
)
, 1
]
.
(22)
Given the first and the second equilibrium conditions presented above, we now consider
the political determination of τ yt that satisfies equilibrium condition 3, and characterize
a poor-majority equilibrium with no taxation on the old, that is, an equilibrium that
supports the POUM hypothesis.
Proposition A
(i) Suppose that β ≤ (2/ηow− 1)/(w− 1/4ηo) holds. There exists a set of poor-majority
equilibrium with no taxation on the old such that ∀t, T o is given by (21), U(τ yt )
is given by (22), and T y = (1 + β · (w − 1/4ηo)) /2. The equilibrium outcome is
unique and such that ∀t, τ yt = (1 + β · (w − 1/4ηo)) /2, τ ot = 0, and ut = 1 −
(1 + β · (w − 1/4ηo)) /4.
(ii) Suppose that β > (2/ηow− 1)/(w− 1/4ηo), β ≥ {ηow/4− (1− 1/ηow)}/(w− 1/4ηo),
and β ≤ (1/ηow)/(w − 1/4ηo) hold. There exists a set of poor-majority equilibrium
with no taxation on the old such that ∀t, T o is given by (21), U(τ yt ) is given by (22),
and T y = β · (w−1/4ηo)+(1−1/ηow). The equilibrium outcome is unique and such
that ∀t, τ yt = β · (w − 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηow), τ ot = 0, and ut = 1− 1/2ηow(> 1/2).
Proof.
(i) Suppose that under the assumption of β ≤ (2/ηow−1)/(w−1/4ηo), agents know that
τ yt = (1 + β · (w − 1/4ηo))/2 and expect τ ot+1 = 0. Then:
1− ey∗
(
1 + β · (w − 1/4ηo)
2
, 0
)
= ut+1 = 1− 1
4
(
1 + β ·
(
w − 1
4ηo
))
≥ 1− 1
2ηow
.
By (21), this implies that τ ot+1 = 0, fulfilling initial expectations.
Setting τ yt = (1 + β · (w − 1/4ηo))/2 is optimal for the decisive voter if this setting
is feasible under the expectation of τ ot+1 = 0, i.e., if β · (w − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηow) ≤
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(1+β ·(w−1/4ηo))/2 ≤ 1. The first inequality is rewritten as β ≤ (2/ηow−1)/(w−1/4ηo),
which is equivalent to the current assumption; and the second inequality always holds
under the assumption of βw < 1.
(ii) Suppose that at time t, agents know that τ yt = β · (w − 1/4ηo) + (1 − 1/ηow) and
expect τ ot+1 = 0. Then:
1− ey∗
(
β ·
(
w − 1
4ηo
)
+
(
1− 1
ηow
)
, 0
)
= ut+1 = 1− 1
2ηow
.
By (21), this implies that τ ot+1 = 0, fulfilling initial expectations. A poor-majority equilib-
rium exists if the decisive voter finds it optimal to set τ yt = β · (w− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηow).
To establish that setting τ yt = β · (w− 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηow) is optimal for the decisive
voter, we first note that setting τ yt = (1+ β · (w− 1/4ηo))/2 is not feasible under the first
assumption:
β > (2/ηow − 1)/(w − 1/4ηo). (23)
Given this condition, we consider the following two cases: β > (1 − 1/ηow)/(w − 1/4ηo)
and β ≤ (1− 1/ηow)/(w − 1/4ηo).
First, suppose that a set of parameters satisfies β · (w − 1/4ηo) > (1− 1/ηow), i.e.:
β > (1− 1/ηow)/(w − 1/4ηo). (24)
Following the logic in the proof of Proposition 1(i), setting τ yt = β ·(w−1/4ηo)+(1−1/ηow)
is sustained as an equilibrium if Z(β · (w−1/4ηo)+(1−1/ηow), 0) ≥ Z(β · (w−1/4ηo), 0),
i.e., if:
β ≤ 1/ηow
w − 1/4ηo . (25)
Second, suppose that a set of parameters satisfies β · (w − 1/4ηo) ≤ (1− 1/ηow), i.e.:
β ≤ (1− 1/ηow)/(w − 1/4ηo). (26)
Following the logic in the proof of Proposition 1(ii), setting τ yt = β·(w−1/4ηo)+(1−1/ηow)
is sustained as an equilibrium if:
Z(β · (w − 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηow), 0) ≥ Z(β · (w − 1/4ηo), 0),
and:
Z(β · (w − 1/4ηo) + (1− 1/ηow), 0) ≥ Z(1/2, 1),
32
that is, if:
β ≤ 1/ηow
w − 1/4ηo and β ≥
ηow/4− (1− 1/ηow)
w − 1/4ηo . (27)
In sum, there exists a poor-majority equilibrium featured by τ yt = β · (w − 1/4ηo) +
(1− 1/ηow) and τ ot+1 = 0 if (23), (24) and (25) hold or if (23), (26) and (27) hold. These
conditions are reduced to (23) and (27). ¥
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Figure 1: The figure illustrates the scatter plot of the Gini indexes for eight OECD
countries (Denmark, Finland, Frace, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and
the United States). The data of the Gini indexes are from Figure 10 in Fo¨rster and Mira
d’Ercole (2005). The data of upward mobility are from Table 3.7a in OECD (1996). Panel
(a) depicts the mobility rate of aged 25-34 workers; Panel (b) depicts the mobility rate of
aged 35-49 workers.
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Figure 2: Timing of events and the distribution of the rich and the poor.
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Figure 3: The determination of τ ot .
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Figure 4: The equilibrium decision rule ut+1 = U(τ
y
t ). The solod lines show the graphs
of U satisfying equilibrium condition 2.
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Figure 5: The set of parameters (β, ηo) classified according to the characterization of
political equilibria.
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Figure 6: The tax revenue from the young, Z, under the set of parameters provided in
Proposition 1. Panel (a) illustrates the case of Proposition 1(i); panel (b) illustrates the
case of Proposition 2(ii).
41
 Figure 7: Numerial results for the case of β = (0.96)20. The horizontal axis indicates
the parameter ηo. Panel (a) depicts the upward mobility rate e
o; panel (b) depicts the
Gini index.
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Figure 8: Numerical results for the case of β = (0.96)20. Panel (a) depicts the tax rate
on the young; Panel (b) depicts educational investment by the young.
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 Figure 9: Numerical results for the case of β = (0.96)20. Panel (a) depicts the expected
utility of the young agents; Panel (b) depicts the social welfare.
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Figure 10: Panel (a) summarizes the information about per capita income, the size of
population and total income for each type of agents. Panel (b) illustrates the Lorenz
curve for the case in which the tax rate on the old is zero.
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